I study the long run determinacy tradeo¤ -recurrent episodes of passive monetary policy are (in)determinate if their expected duration is long (brief ) -when passive policy is at the zero bound. On-going regime change implies qualitatively di¤erent shock transmission from the standard New Keynesian model. For U.S. baseline parameter values, I …nd temporary …scal stimulus is e¤ective, while adverse supply shocks can be expansionary if the central bank's active policy stance is weak and/or if the liquidity trap's average duration exceeds 3 quarters.
Introduction
How do expectations of recurring zero interest rates a¤ect the transmission of fundamental shocks? In an important contribution, Davig and Leeper (2007) generalized the Taylor (1993) principle -the proposition that central banks stabilize the economy by raising their policy rate more than one-for-one in response to higher in ‡ation -from a …xed-regime to a regime-switching New Keynesian model. Monetary policy's reaction to ‡uctuations can then switch from an active regime, characterized by an aggressive in ‡ation response, to a passive regime with less aggressive response following a Markov chain with exogenous transition probabilities.
A key insight of these authors is that determinate (i.e., unique and bounded) solution paths depend on all model parameters. Of these, in this paper I focus on the passive regime's expected duration when conventional monetary policy is completely passive and short-term nominal interest rates are at their zero bound (ZB). This matters for three reasons. First, the impact elasticities of output to fundamental shocks tend to be very di¤erent when conventional policy is switched o¤. For example, the New Keynesian model predicts that temporary adverse supply shocks are expansionary at the ZB, while the multiplier e¤ect of government spending shocks is sharply higher. 1 Second, equilibrium indeterminacy leads to non-unique propagation of fundamental shocks and excess volatility caused by nonfundamentals (sunspots), and should thus be avoided; see Benhabib et al. (2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . And, third, the profession is gradually realizing that ZB episodes are not one-o¤ but may recur. The U.S. 3-month Treasury Bill data shown in Figure 1 indicates the ZB constraint has been binding about 6:6 percent over the period 1934:01-2015:05: 2 
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To be sure, one may question inference based on 80 years of data considering the profound structural changes in the economy, as well as the conduct of monetary policy in the last I follow Davig and Leeper (2007) in specifying that regime change is an exogenous (iid) Markov process, based on what these authors call the emergency response-driven trigger of the ZB regime. In principle, the likelihood that future regimes di¤er from the present one may also be triggered by sunspot or con…dence shocks (Mertens and Ravn (2014) ). Following the long-run determinacy principle, large deviations from the original Taylor (1993) principle -as when conventional monetary policy is "switched o¤" -must be short-lived. It follows that requiring equilbrium paths to be determinate implies a maximum average duration for ZB episodes. Speci…cally, for U.S. baseline parameters values I establish that ZB episodes expected to last more than 3 quarters are inconsistent with determinacy, all else equal. E¤ectively, imposing a minimum exit rate from liquidity traps amounts to restricting attention to fundamental-based ZB episodes.
Assuming fundamental-shock ‡uctuations around a unique steady state, the New Keynesian DSGE consensus is that temporary adverse supply shocks are recessionary in normal times but expansionary at the ZB, while the government spending multiplier is ampli…ed. Against that background, I show the "puzzling"implications only arise when equilibrium is indeterminate. Speci…cally, short-term …scal stimulus is always expansionary and temporary adverse supply shocks are generally contractionary. During liquidity traps, however, the output impact of such shocks can be positive if the central bank active policy stance is weak. Intuitively, agents expect higher in ‡ation because they anticipate a less reactive monetary policy in the active regime. In turn, that expectation lowers expected real interest rates and stimulates current output. Adopting a progressively less responsive active policy stance, the output elasticity of a 1 standard deviation in ‡ation shock can be as high as 4:5. By contrast, the government spending multiplier at the ZB is around 4 regardless of the speci…c policy rule, provided the ZB episode is expected to be brief. Thus, temporary …scal consolidation is never expansionary inside the determinacy region. Comparing across regimes, I …nd the spending multiplier is about 0:6 in the active regime but always exceeds one during liquidity traps, starting around 1:7 for one-o¤ ZB events.
The results suggest the possibility that the on-going, long ZB episode is indeterminate. A similar uncomfortable implication was raised by Davig (2014)), to name but a few. All these contributions assume ZB events are temporary. Rather, the empirical implication here is that, given their exogenous incidence, policymakers should strive to limit their duration, so as to prevent the welfare deterioration commonly associated with nonunique fundamental transmission and sunspot-driven business cycles.
The regime-switching model
A closed economy with nominal rigidities is described by the forward-looking aggregate supply (AS/NKPC) and demand (AD) relationships
(1)
where the period-t in ‡ation rate t , output gap x t and nominal interest rate i t -henceforth, the policy rate -are expressed in log deviations from a unique steady-state, and the parameters have the familiar interpretation. 4 The mean-zero AS and AD shocks, u S t and u D t respectively, are exogenous demand (government spending) and supply (in ‡ation, or productivity) disturbances following independent stationary AR(1) processes:
where D , S 2 [0; 1) and " In any period, the economy is either in the active regime, denoted a, where the policy rate is strictly positive and determined by a Taylor-type rule, or the passive (ZB) regime, z, where it is zero and the feedback portion of the rule is inactive:
where > 1, x 0, s t 2 fa; zg, t = fs t 1 ; s t 2 ; :::g and the regimes'ergodic probabilities P a and P z are de…ned below. 4 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor; NKPC slope > 0 is proportional to the degree of nominal rigidity; and 1 > 0 is the interest-elasticity of output. 5 I do not label the regimes conventional and unconventional because my model is highly stylized, abstracting from non-traditional policy instruments including large-scale asset purchases by the central bank. I also refrain from calling the active regime normal because of Japan's ZB experience since the 1990s.
Regime change in equations (4) is not triggered by large fundamental or taste shocks as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , where the policy rule is i t = maxfr n t + t ; 0g with a time-varying natural real interest rate. Rather, it captures monetary policy's periodic shift in focus from price stability to concerns such as systemic risk and …nancial stability. The short-run dynamics are driven by the homogeneous Markov transition matrix:
The o¤-diagonal elements, p ij > 0 (i; j 2 fa; zg) satisfying p ii + p ij = 1, are de…ned as
where s t is independent of u D t and u S t . Regime i persistence and expected duration are then given by p ii > 0 and (1 p ii ) 1 = T i > 1, respectively. 6 Each recurrent policy regime has positive ergodic probability given by:
where P a + P z = 1; see Hamilton (1994) . Equations (6)- (7) imply a long-run tradeo¤: if regime i's incidence increases then its expected duration must become shorter, and vice versa. As shown by Davig and Leeper (2007) and Richter and Throckmorton (2015) , equilibrium determinacy requires the ZB regime's expected duration to be su¢ ciently short. Put differently, the long-run Taylor principle need not hold every period provided large deviations from it are short-lived; see also Nakata and Schmidt (2014).
Shock propagation under a …xed active regime is well understood: positive AD shocks are expansionary and in ‡ationary; adverse AS shocks are stag ‡ationary. Otherwise, the New Keynesian Markov-switching model is fully described by the linear system By t = AE t y t+1 + Cu t ,
where 5
Matrix A includes the exogenous transition probabilities; matrix B includes the active response coe¢ cients and x ; and C stacks the fundamental shocks. Davig and Leeper (2007) show that the solutions of (8) are determinate i¤ all four eigenvalues of , denoted i (i = 1; :::; 4) are outside the unit circle. That is indeed the case for most parameter values when the passive regime is the ZB. 7 In general, the solution paths of (8) are given by:
where w t is a non-fundamental variable. Let k is the number of eigenvalues of inside the unit circle. Then V is 2xk, is kxk, and M is any kx2 real matrix. If k = 1, matrix becomes a scalar equal to the eigenvalue inside the unit circle, measuring sunspot persistence. It is important for policymakers to avoid actions that would induce indeterminacy, as the excess output volatility caused by sunspots reduces welfare if agents are risk-averse. In what follows I focus on linear minimum state variable (MSV) solutions within the determinate region (k = 0). The MSV solutions of system (8) involve four target variables: Assuming a determinate solution to the regime-switching model (8) exists and guessing the 7 The determinacy region is very similar to Davig and Leeper (2007 
for AS shocks and 2 
for AD shocks. Analytical solutions to equation systems (14)- (15) are readily computed but di¢ cult to interpret; note that one-o¤ ZB events amount to the special case p za = 1.
Expectation formation e¤ects
Leading equations (12)- (13) by one period, applying de…nitions (3) and imposing S = D = , wlog, the regime-speci…c in ‡ation and output gap expectations are:
where i; j 2 fa; zg. All else equal, equations (16)- (17) indicate that expectation formation e¤ects from regime i to j increase in p ji > 0 and p ii > 0. The two transition probabilities are independently determined by Markov matrix M . 8 To gauge expectation spillovers across regimes, I apply expectation de…nitions (16)- (17) to AD relation (2) and write:
8 If the ZB constraint was approached gradually then setting a higher in ‡ation target would lower ZB incidence, all else equal, and p az could not be speci…ed exogenously; see Chung et al. (2012).
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The four regime-speci…c output elasticities are de…ned as c
, f 2 fD; Sg, i 2 fa; zg. A useful benchmark of on-going regime change on c f i is equal expected duration, p aa = p zz = p. Equations (18)-(19) then imply:
for AD and
for AS shocks. Equations (20)- (23) 9 To see this, note that the numerator (denominator) of (20) is less (greater) than of (21) for all 1 > 0.
The regime-speci…c in ‡ation rates are similarly obtained by substituting (16)- (17) One-o¤ ZB events. If the active regime is absorbing (p za = 1), the regime-speci…c spending multipliers and ZB-speci…c output elasticity to AS shocks become:
More severe ZB episodes (higher p az ) lower c D a , indicating that ignoring recurrent regime change is likely to underestimate the average government spending multiplier.
Fundamental shock transmission 4.1 Baseline calibration
In calibrating the regime-switching model, I adopt as baseline the U.S. parameter estimates of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Davig and Leeper (2007) , referred to as LS and DL, with the exception of the choice of p zz and the active policy stance where I use the optimal policy response coe¢ cients of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), referred to as SU. They are summarized in Table 1 : Table 1 I combine p aa = 0:975 -one ZB episode per decade, on average -with p zz = 0:647 (T z = 2:83 quarters), the passive regime persistence matching P z = 0:066, the U.S. historical ZB frequency from Figure 1 . 11 That is because the LS choice of p zz = 0:93 -liquidity traps expected to last 3:5 years -is inconsistent with determinacy. To see why, I establish a maximum persistence threshold, p max zz < 1 -i.e., a minimum ZB exit rate p min za > 0 -beyond which equilibrium solution paths become indeterminate. I illustrate this threshold in Figure  2 , …xing p aa = 0:975 and plotting min , the minimum eigenvalue of system (8) against p zz :
FIGURE 2 HERE
In all four cases, min crosses the indeterminacy point ( = 1) only once because the regimeswitching New Keynesian model displays degree-one indeterminacy. Under the baseline (Panel A), the maximum persistence is p max zz = 0:668, implying p min za = 0:332 or T z ' 3 quarters. The tentative implication is that historical ZB persistence is narrowly consistent with equilibrium determinacy, as de…ned in the recurrent regime-switching model. 12 In Panel B, a weaker active transmission mechanism extends the threshold to p Table 2 below reports the unique and bounded regime-speci…c solutions implied by three di¤erent active policy stances: Table 2 . Regime-speci…c impact elasticities 13 
Active
Zero Bound p aa = 0:975 ; p zz = 0:647 P a = 0:934 P z = 0:066 In ‡ation SU baseline: p
Concluding remarks
In contrast to Tambakis (2014) , in the present paper I studied short-term fundamental shock transmission in a New Keynesian recurrent regime-switching model when passive policy involves the ZB. I showed that relatively short (long) ZB episodes are (in)determinate, and explored the impact elasticities'sensitivity to ZB expected duration and fundamental shock persistence. For determinate liquidity traps, I found that temporary in ‡ation shocks are contractionary provided the central bank's active policy stance is aggressive enough; such a stance dampens somewhat the increased e¢ cacy of temporary …scal stimulus; and "expansionary austerity"does not arise.
